Introduction by Chat GPT 4.5
Before Nick Land became known as the philosophical architect of Right Accelerationism, he was something else entirely: a radical thinker of the left, confronting the complicity between Enlightenment rationality, colonial capitalism, and the psychic infrastructures of modernity. His 1988 essay, “Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest,” first published in Third Text, belongs to this earlier phase. It is a dense, polemical, and conceptually rich intervention into the philosophical foundations of capitalist modernity, deserving renewed attention today, not only for its provocative theoretical ambition but for its prescience in diagnosing the entangled crises of sovereignty, race, gender, and global power that continue to define contemporary politics.
This introduction serves a dual purpose: first, to reframe Land’s essay for contemporary readers who may be more familiar with his later, controversial positions or who may not yet appreciate the philosophical stakes of this early work; second, to argue for its urgent relevance in a moment when geopolitical antagonisms the essay gestures toward have become increasingly hard to ignore, especially in the ongoing catastrophe in Palestine. Land’s diagnosis of “inhibited synthesis” — the strategic foreclosure of cultural and political mixture by patriarchal and capitalist institutions — offers a conceptual tool for understanding the systematic statelessness imposed on Palestine and the coordinated efforts by Israel and its Western and Gulf allies to maintain this condition. The war on “Palestinian becoming” can be read, in Landian terms, as a war on social and political synthesis.
What Land identifies in Kant is not merely an abstract philosophical error or his conceptual blind spot but a historical configuration of thought that shapes the logic of coloniality and economic domination. Kant’s commitment to the a priori, to knowledge that comes “in advance” of experience, is read by Land as a symptom of modernity’s attempt to predetermine its relation to alterity. The Enlightenment, far from opening Europe to the other, institutes a mechanism of control: a way to “touch the other without vulnerability.” This is, for Land, not simply a problem of epistemology but of political economy and libidinal order. In Kant’s transcendental synthesis, Land hears the echo of patriarchal law, of incest prohibition, of capitalist exchange.
To read Land in this early text is to confront a thinker still immersed in the language of Marx, Nietzsche, and feminism, but already transgressing the disciplinary boundaries that keep critique separate from desire, and political economy separate from kinship structures. The essay constructs a bridge between the critique of metaphysics and the critique of “glopartheid.” It anticipates many of the critical insights now central to decolonial theory, feminist materialism, and anti-statist/anachist political imaginaries.
At the center of the essay is the concept of inhibited synthesis, a term Land uses to describe the condition wherein capitalist modernity simultaneously enables and forecloses cultural exchange. Capitalism, he argues, is not simply a system of economic exploitation but a deeply structured compromise between the logic of trade (exogamy, synthesis, difference) and the logic of identity (endogamy, genealogy, sameness). What results is a system that displaces the political consequences of labour and exchange onto racialized and feminized bodies, geographically and conceptually. In Kant’s transcendental subject, Land sees the idealized figure of the bourgeois patriarch: the one who legislates without relation, who encounters the world only on terms he has already authored.
For readers seeking to understand the current alignment between Israel, Western powers, and the Gulf monarchies in their (a)symetrical wars against Palestinian sovereignty, this framework offers a chilling analytical clarity. The Palestinian people, rendered stateless, mobile, and other, are not merely victims of military aggression or colonial expansion. They are subjects of inhibited synthesis par excellence: denied the right to mix, to belong, barred from entering the symbolic order of the nation-state. The Oslo Accords and the fantasy of a two-state solution represent the same false promise that Land attributes to apartheid’s bantustan logic: the appearance of autonomy that conceals deep structural exclusion. National sovereignty, far from being the solution to Palestinian liberation, functions in this schema as the very mechanism of their continued dispossession.
The relevance of Land’s essay becomes even sharper when one considers the rise of xenophobic nationalism and right-wing ethno-states globally, developments he now unfortunately embraces. The logic of inhibited synthesis can contextualize policies of border fortification, anti-migrant violence, and settler expansion. In the name of protecting cultural identity or national coherence, states enact forms of endogamy at the scale of policy, suppressing the very exogamic flows on which capitalism depends. the old Nick Land’s critical insight is that capitalism does not dissolve difference; it manages it. It depends on the other, but only as commodity, as labour, and as disposable surplus. Full absorption of the other would collapse the system’s ability to extract surplus; full exclusion would foreclose access to labour and resources. The system’s success lies in maintaining a condition of suspended relation: a contact without communion and proximity without reciprocity.
This is why Land links Kant to apartheid, and both to fascism. The dream of purity — whether in thought, blood, or nation — is not a regression from capitalist modernity but its latent expression. Fascism, in Land’s analysis, is the logical culmination of the European Enlightenment’s refusal to be transformed by alterity. It is the militant defense of inhibited synthesis, a purification of the social body against the contaminating forces of the other. This is why the essay speaks directly to our moment, when fascist currents flow easily through liberal democracies under the guise of security, order, and tradition.
However, the essay is not merely diagnostic. It is also a gesture toward a different kind of politics: one rooted in the exogamic, the synthetic, the feminist. Land ends with a call for revolutionary feminism as the only force capable of breaking the historical bond between masculinity and war, identity and domination. In the anonymous, untraceable movements of women across borders of kinship and citizenship, he sees the potential for a politics that exceeds the patronymic order. For Land, feminism is not about representation within existing structures but the undoing of those structures themselves. This is a feminism that does not ask to be recognized but instead dismantles the infrastructure of recognition.
Land’s analysis of sexuality, gender, colonialism and capitalism operates within a rigorously materialist framework of political economy that encompasses social culture and human desire, making it more systematically grounded than the arguments put forth by the likes of Edward Said and Judith Butler hindered by their Foucauldian poststructuralist inheritance. While Said’s Orientalism and Butler’s Gender Trouble analyze power as primarily discursive and representational, they fail to account for the material conditions underlying these cultural formations. Land’s concept of “inhibited synthesis” demonstrates how patriarchal kinship functions as the fundamental organizing principle of capital accumulation itself—the mechanism by which political consequences of capitalism are violently displaced away from the metropolis to the periphery where legal and ilegal immigrant labour are imported, sustaining an equilibrium of exogamic exchange. Where Said and Butler remain trapped within the “dual organization” of poststructuralist thought (discourse/materiality), Land reveals how the prohibition of incest operates as the proto-cultural fundament enabling capital to ethnically and geographically quarantine its consequences from itself. His framework shows how sexuality, gender, and colonial relations are not separate intersecting domains but manifestations of a single system of “patriarchal neo-colonial capital accumulation” coordinating global labor flows and political instability through kinship regulation. This materialist approach to political economy—encompassing the libidinal economy of patriarchy, the sexual economy of race and gender, and the geographical economy of imperial exploitation—offers more systematic analysis than poststructuralism’s culturalist tendencies, which because of their Foucauldian heritage remain complicit with the very “inhibition of synthesis” characterizing modernity’s relationship to radical alterity.
One of the barriers to accessing Land’s early work is its density. Written in a style more aligned with the libidinal intensities of Bataille and Lyotard than the procedural clarity of analytic philosophy, “Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest” can be daunting, especially for younger readers habituated to the accelerated legibility of contemporary media. To address this, we have prepared a condensed version of the essay, preserving its language, argumentation, and conceptual structure, while reducing it to approximately 3,000 words. This is not a paraphrase or summary, but a careful excision of redundancy and peripheral elaboration — an editorial operation in the spirit of the text’s own demand for clarity through violence.
What emerges in this reduced version is the skeleton of Land’s argument, stripped to its essentials: a genealogy of capitalist modernity as the continuation of patriarchal control by other means; a critique of Enlightenment reason as the a priori murder of alterity; and a call for an insurgency against the totalizing inertia of the state. It is our hope that this compressed format opens the text to new readers. The task is not merely to read Land, but to think with and against him — to inhabit the tensions he exposes and to extend them toward emancipatory ends.
In a time when Gaza is bombed with impunity and statelessness is normalized, the stakes of Land’s early critique could not be clearer. “Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest” is not a historical relic of the late 1980s critical theory. It is a map of the present. For those committed to undoing the world as it is, Land’s text offers both a diagnosis and a dare: the end of Kantianism is the end of modernity. And to reach this end, we must, as he writes, foster new Amazons in our midst.
Summary by Claude Opus 4
For the purposes of understanding the complex network of race, gender, and class oppressions that constitute our global modernity it is very rewarding to attend to the evolution of the apartheid policies of the South African regime, since apartheid is directed towards the construction of a microcosm of the neo-colonial order; a recapitulation of the world in miniature. The most basic aspiration of the Boer state is the dissociation of politics from economic relations, so that by means of ‘bantustans’ or ‘homelands’ the black African population can be suspended in a condition of simultaneous political distance and economic proximity vis-a-vis the white metropolis. This policy seeks to recast the currently existing political exteriority of the black population into a system of geographical relations modelled on national sovereignty.
My contention is that the Third World as a whole is the product of a successful—although piecemeal and largely unconscious—’bantustan’ policy on the part of the global Kapital metropolis. Any attempt by political forces in the Third World to resolve the problems of their neo-colonial integration into the world trading system on the basis of national sovereignty is as naive as the attempt of black South Africans would be if they opted for a ‘bantustan’ solution.
The displacement of the political consequences of wage labour relations away from the metropolis is not an incidental feature of capital accumulation, as the economic purists aligned to both the bourgeoisie and the workerist left assert. It is rather the fundamental condition of capital as nothing other than an explicit aggression against the masses. Marx’s account of “so-called primitive accumulation” clearly demonstrates that the origin of wage labour relations is not itself economic, but lies in an overt war against the people, or their forced removal from previous conditions of subsistence.
Capital has always sought to distance itself in reality—i.e. geographically—from this brutal political infrastructure. After all, the ideal of bourgeois politics is the absence of politics, since capital is nothing other than the consistent displacement of social decision-making into the market place. But this ideal of total de-politicization, or the absolute annihilation of resistance to market relations, is an impossible megalomaniac fantasy, and Marx’s contention that labour trading at its natural price will tend strongly to express an equally ‘natural’ political refusal of the market, continues to haunt the global bourgeoisie.
The only practical option available to the rulers of capitalist societies has lain in the global dis-aggregation of the political system, accompanied by a regional distortion of the world labour trading system in favour of the working classes in the metropolitan regions (‘welfare capitalism’). Since it is of systematic necessity that the economic conditions of an undistorted labour market is accompanied by political crisis, the world order functions as an integrated process based upon the flow of market-priced labour into the metropolis from the Third World, and the export of political instability to the Third World from the metropolis. The global labour market is easily interpreted, therefore, as a sustained demographic disaster that is systematically displaced away from the political institutions of the metropolis.
This process of displacement, which is the ultimate ‘base’ or ‘infrastructure’ of capital accumulation, is dependent upon those issues of ‘kinships’ or ‘marriage organization’ (the sexual economy of gender and race) which Marxists have often tended to consider as surface features of an underlying mode of production. I shall argue that with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant Western cultural history culminates in a self-reflecting bourgeois civilization, because his thought of synthesis (or relation to alterity), and also the strangulation of this thought within his system, captures modernity as a problem. But the modernity thus symptomized is not primarily the penultimate phase of a dialectic of society and production, it is rather the necessity that historically itself—expansionary social and economic development, or ‘synthesis’—compromises with a profound continuity whose basic aspects are patrilineal descent and a formal logic of identity already concluded by Aristotle. These aspects, the genealogical and the logical, are functions of a position of abstract masculine subjectivity coincident with the patronymic. This position is the proto-cultural fundament of everything that is able to count as the same.
Modernity is not merely a compromise between novel forms of commercially driven social organization and this archaic cultural pattern of patrilineal exogamy, but more fundamentally, a deepening of the compromise already integral to any exogamy that is able to remain patrilineal. It is only by understanding the inhibitive function of patriarchies in relation to exogamic dissipation (an inhibition that is supremely logical in that it conserves identity, and which is for this reason violently xenophobic) that we can make sense of capital production and its tendency towards the peculiar cultural mutation that was baptised by Mussolini as ‘fascism’. This is because the restriction of cultural synthesis, based upon a strenuous endogamy at the level of the national community, is the ultimate outcome of the concerted ‘liberalization’ of kinship organizations within (metropolitan) industrial societies.
A capitalist trading empire is a developed form of exogamic patriarchy, and inherits its tensions. Domination of the other is inhibited in principle from developing into full absorption, because it is the residual alterity of the other that conditions the generation of surplus. The parallel difference between a labour market and a slave market is based on the fact that one cannot do business with a slave (but only with a slave-owner), and similarly, one cannot base a kinship system upon a harem. But what is crucial to the demarcation of a colonial from a neo-colonial system is a transnational diffusion of ethnicity. As soon as a metropolitan society disengages its organization of kinship and citizenship from its international economic syntheses it already reveals proto-fascist traits.
The disaster of world history is that capitalism was never the progressive unwinding of patrilineage through a series of generalized exploitative relations associated with a trans-cultural exogamy, leading to an uncontrollable eruption of feminine (i.e. migrant) alterity into the father’s heartland, and thus to the emergence of a radical—or ethnically disruptive and post-patriarchal—synthesis. Instead, kinship and trade were systematically isolated from each other, so that the internationalization of the economy was coupled with an entrenchment of xenophobic (nationalistic) kinship practices, maintaining a concentration of political and economic power within an isolated and geographically sedentary ethnic stock. Capital is the point at which a culture refuses the possibility—which it has itself engendered—of pushing the prohibition of incest towards its limit.
I want to touch upon this condition of modernity—which can be awkwardly described as patriarchal neo-colonial capital accumulation, but which I shall come to name ‘inhibited synthesis’—not as a historian or a political theorist, but as a philosopher. Western societies departed from the stagnant theocracies of the Middle Ages through a series of more or less violent convulsions that have engendered an explosive possibility of novelty on earth. But these same societies simultaneously shackled this new history by systematically compromising it. This ambiguous movement of ‘enlightenment’ characterizes the emergence of industrial societies trading in commodities. An enlightenment society wants both to learn and to legislate for all time, to open itself to the other and to consolidate itself from within, to expand indefinitely whilst reproducing itself as the same. Its ultimate dream is to grow whilst remaining identical to what it was, to touch the other without vulnerability. Where the European ancien regime was parochial and insular, modernity is appropriative. It lives in a profound but uneasy relation to an outside that both attracts and repels it, a relation that it precariously resolves within itself on the basis of exploitation, or interaction from a position of unilateral mastery.
The paradox of enlightenment, then, is an attempt to fix a stable relation with what is radically other, since insofar as the other is rigidly positioned within a relation it is no longer fully other. If before encountering otherness we already know what its relation to us will be, we have obliterated it in advance. And this brutal denial is the effective implication of the thought of the a priori, since if our certainties come to us without reference to otherness we have always already torn out the tongue of alterity before entering into relation with it. This aggressive logical absurdity (the absurdity of logic itself) reaches its zenith in the philosophy of Kant, whose basic problem was to find an account for the possibility of what he termed “synthetic a priori knowledge”, which is knowledge that is both given in advance by ourselves, and yet adds to what we know. This problem is the same as that of accounting for the possibility of modernity or enlightenment, which is to say, of the inhibited encounter with alterity.
Kant thought that both empiricist and rationalist philosophers had accepted the simple alignment of the synthetic with the a posteriori and of the analytic with the a priori. This assumption was not accepted by Kant, who re-aligned the two pairs of concepts in a perpendicular fashion to form a grid, thus yielding four permutations. He clung doggedly to the possibility of knowledge that would be both synthetic and a priori. This new conception of knowledge was relevant to the conditions of experience. Kant described his ‘Copernican revolution’ in philosophy as a shift from the question ‘what must the mind be like in order to know?’ to the question ‘what must objects be like in order to be known?’ The answers to this latter question would provide a body of synthetic a priori knowledge, telling us about experience without being derived from experience.
Because a developed knowledge of the conditions of experience presupposes a relation to the outside it is synthetic and not analytic, but because it concerns the pure form of the relation as such and not the sensory material involved in the relation it is a priori and not a posteriori. Kant’s ‘object’ is thus the universal form of the relation to alterity; that which must of necessity be the same in the other in order for it to appear to us. This universal form is the ‘exchange value’ that first allows a thing to be marketed to the enlightenment mind. Between medieval scholasticism and Kant Western reason moves from a parochial economy to a system in which, abandoning the project of repressing the traffic with alterity, one resolves instead to control the system of trade.
Claude Lévi-Strauss notes the frequent distinction made by various societies between normal and ‘rich food’. Rich food occupies the position of women within a marriage system regulated by patrilineal exogamy, with its producer renouncing it for himself, and thus echoing the prohibition of incest. What is of particular philosophical interest is that it also marks a distinction between the ‘rational’ (analytic) and the ’empirical’ (synthetic), and thus defines a terrain upon which we can sketch an economy of knowledge. If ‘rich food’ is the primordial element of trade its metamorphosis into the modern ‘commodity’ can be seen as a suppression of radical synthesis, the problematic process which provides enlightenment reason with its object of thought.
The cultural inhibition of synthesis takes a form that Lévi-Strauss calls ‘dual organization’. A dual organization arises when two groups form a closed system of reciprocal exchange, in which each consumes the rich food, and marries the women, of the other. Such organizations reproduce themselves culturally through shared myths articulated around basic dualities. The function of these myths is to capture alterity within a system of rules, to provide it with an identity, and to exclude the possibility of the radically different. Kant inherited a philosophical tradition whose decisive concepts were organized into basic couples (spirit/matter, form/content, abstract/concrete, universal/particular, etc.).
Since ‘reality’ is itself a transcendental concept, Kant’s usage of a distinction between appearance and reality to restrict the deployment of pure concepts already suggests a crucial difficulty with his project. The structure of Kantian critique itself perpetuates the oppositional form of metaphysical thought, since its resolution of the antinomies depends upon the mobilization of further dichotomies. Kant still wants to say something about radical alterity, even if it is only that it has no relevance to us, yet he has deprived himself of the right to all speculation about the nature of what is beyond appearance. It is thus the inhibition of synthesis—the delimitation of alterity in advance—that sets up the modern form of the ontological question: ‘how do we know that matter exists?’ Alterity cannot be registered unless it can be inscribed within the system, according to the interconnected axes of exchange value (price) and the patronymic, or, in other words, as a commodity with an owner.
Modern capital has brought about a fundamental dislocation between filiation and alliance by simultaneously de-regulating alliance and abstracting it from all kinship implications. The primordial anthropological bond between marriage and trade is dissolved, in order that capital can ethnically and geographically quarantine its consequences from itself. The question of racism, which arises under patriarchal capital as the default of a global trade in women (a parochialism in the system of misogynistic violence; the non-emergence of a trans-cultural exogamy), is bound in profound but often paradoxical ways to the functioning of patriarchy and capital. Systematic racism is a sign that class positions within the general (trans-national) economy are being distributed on a racial basis, which implies an effective, if not a juridical, apartheid.
Kant was able to remain bourgeois without overtly promoting racism only because he also remained an idealist, or in other words a Christian (a “cunning Christian” as Nietzsche calls him), and identified universality with ideality rather than with power. It is only with the implicit recognition of the need for a systematic evacuation of rebellion from the metropolis by means of a geographically distorted labour market that racism arises in its contemporary form, which is ultimately that of a restricted franchise (on a national basis) over the political management of the global means of production.
It is in his second critique, The Critique of Practical Reason, that Kant capitalizes upon the ethno-ethical consequences of the first: that justice must be prosecuted without negotiation. Kant’s moral theory is an ethics of appropriative modernity, and breaks with the parochial or scriptural morality of the ancien regime. Only that is moral which can be demanded of every rational being unconditionally, in the name of an ultra-empire that Kant names the ’empire of ends’ (Reich der Zwecke). The law of this empire is called the ‘categorical imperative’, which means a law stemming solely from the purity of the concept, and thus dictated by the absolute monologue of colonial reason. The law is that which cannot be legitimately discussed, and which is therefore an unresponsive or unilateral imposition. The second critique distills the xenophobic violence of the first and elevates it to the most extreme possible fanaticism. Where theoretical knowledge is open to a limited negotiation with alterity, practical or moral certainty is forbidden from entering into relation with anything outside itself, except to issue commands. Kant’s practical subject already pre-figures a deaf führer, barking impossible orders that seem to come from another world.
Kant makes a further strenuous effort to push forward the horizon of a priori synthesis in his third critique, The Critique of Judgement. If the first critique corresponds to appropriative economy or commodification, and the second critique corresponds to imperial jurisdiction, the third critique corresponds to the exercise of war at those margins of the global system that continue to resist both the market and the administration. In the third critique there is a far more aggressive conception of excess, which generates a feeling of delight, because it is essentially extortionate. Kant argues that we have no transcendental right to expect natural laws to be sufficiently homogeneous for us to grasp. The submission of the outside in general to the inside in general, or of nature to the idea, i.e. conquest, is not guaranteed by any principle. Kant’s advice to the imperial war-machine in his third critique can be summarized as this: “treat all resistance as if it were less than you might justifiably fear”. The Critique of Judgement thus projects the global victory of capitalized reason as pure and exuberant ambition.
The only possible politics of purity is fascism, or a militant activism rooted in the inhibitory and exclusive dimensions of a metropolitanism. Racism, as a regulated, automatic, and indefinitely suspended process of genocide is the real condition of persistence for a global economic system that is dependent upon an aggregate price of labour approximating to the cost of its bare subsistence, and therefore upon an expanding pool of labour power which must be constantly ‘stimulated’ into this market by an annihilating poverty. If fascism is evaded in metropolitan societies it is only because a chronic passive genocide trails in the wake of capital and commodity markets as they displace themselves around the Third World, ‘disciplining’ the labour market.
The forces most unambiguously antagonistic to this grotesque process are ‘exogamic’ (or, less humanistically, ‘exotropic’); the synthetic energies that condition all surplus value, and yet co-exist with capital only under repression. A radical international socialism would not be a socialist ideology generalized beyond its culture of origin, but a programme of collectivity or unrestrained synthesis that springs from the theoretical and libidinal dissolution of national totality. To get to a world without nations would in itself guarantee the achievement of all immediately post-capitalist social and economic goals. It is this revolutionary requirement for a spontaneously homeless subversion that gives an urgency to certain possibilities of feminist politics, since the erasure of matrilineal genealogy within the patriarchal machine means that fascisizing valorizations of ancestry have no final purchase on the feminine ‘subject’. The patronymic has irrecoverably divested all the women who fall under it of any recourse to an ethno-geographical identity; only the twin powers of father and husband suppress the nomadism of the anonymous female fluxes that patriarchy oppressively manipulates, violates, and psychiatrizes.
The increasingly incestual character of economic order—reaching its zenith in racist xenophobia—is easily masked as a series of ‘feminist’ reforms of patriarchy; as a de-commodification of woman, a diminution of the obliterating effects of the patronymic, and a return to the mother. This is the sentimental ‘feminism’ that Nietzsche despised, and whose petit-bourgeois nationalist implications he clearly saw. The only resolutely revolutionary politics is feminist in orientation, but only if the synthetic forces mobilized under patriarchy are extrapolated beyond the possibility of assimilation, rather than being criticized from the perspective of mutilated genealogies.
The women of the earth are segmented only by their fathers and husbands. Their praxial fusion is indistinguishable from the struggle against the micro-powers that suppress them most immediately. That is why the proto-fascism of nationality laws and immigration controls tends to have a sexist character as well as a racist one. It is because women are the historical realization of the potentially euphoric synthetic or communicative function which patriarchy both exploits and inhibits that they are invested with a revolutionary destiny, and it is only through their struggle that politics will be able to escape from all fatherlands.
Perhaps only Monique Wittig has adequately grasped the inescapably military task faced by any serious revolutionary feminism, and it is difficult not to be dispirited by the enormous reluctance women have shown historically to prosecute their struggle with sufficient ruthlessness and aggression. The left tends to be evasive about the numbing violence intrinsic to revolutionary war, and feminism is often particularly fastidious in this respect. If feminist struggles have been constantly de-prioritized in theory and practice it is surely because of their idealistic recoil from the currency of violence, which is to say, from the only definitive ‘matter’ of politics.
The state apparatus of an advanced industrial society can certainly not be defeated without a willingness to escalate the cycle of violence without limit. It is a terrible fact that atrocity is not the perversion, but the very motor of such struggles: the language of inexorable political will. A revolutionary war against a modern metropolitan state can only be fought in hell. It is this harsh truth that has deflected Western politics into an increasingly servile reformism, whilst transforming nationalist struggles into the sole arena of vigorous contention against particular configurations of capital. But such nationalist struggles are relevant only to the geographical modulation of capital, and not to the radical jeopardizing of neo-colonialism (inhibited synthesis) as such. Victorious Third World struggles, so long as they have been successfully localized, do not lead to realistic post-capitalist achievements, since the conservation of the form of the nation state is itself enough to guarantee the reinsertion of a society into the system of inhibited synthesis.
For it is only when the pervasive historical bond between masculinity and war is broken by effective feminist violence that it will become possible to envisage the uprooting of the patriarchal endogamies that orchestrate the contemporary world order. With the abolition of the inhibition of synthesis—of Kantian thought—a sordid cowardice will be washed away, and cowardice is the engine of greed. But the only conceivable end of Kantianism is the end of modernity, and to reach this we must foster new Amazons in our midst.
* The opinions expressed in the intro are generated by Chat GPT’s 4.5 language model and do not represent the editorial views or positions of &&&. The original essay was condensed by Calude’s Opus 4 language model.